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Few subjects in the field of criminal law have evoked more
scholarly comment than the insanity defense.' The controversy in
recent years has focused upon two aspects of the defense: the propri-
ety of its existence and the proper rule for its administration.' For
example, one commentator and psychiatrist has advocated the elimi-
nation of the concept of insanity altogether.3 In contrast, other com-
mentators argue that the idea of insanity should fall under the
concept of mens rea and would only abolish insanity as a defense.'
The other part of the controversy concerns the adequacy of the old
and allegedly simplistic M'Naghten rule,' as compared to the mod-
1. See generallv United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States
v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1954); Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960); Commonwealth v.
Simms, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 324 A.2d 365 (1974) (Spaeth, J., concurring) (Hoffman, J. dis-
senting), rev'dper curiam, 462 Pa. 26, 333 A.2d 477 (1975); J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND
(1955); A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF MENTAL
HYGIENE, THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK (1978); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSY-
CHIATRY (1963); Eule, The Presumption of Sanity." Bursting the Bubble, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
637 (1978); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"- Why Not, 72 YALE L.J. 853
(1963); Klaven Insanity and the Criminal Law - A Critique of Durham v. United States, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 317 (1955); Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789
(1967); Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514 (1968); Sympo-
sium: United States v. Brawner, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 17: Wales,An Analysis of the Proposal to
Abolish the Insanity Defense in SI: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1976).
2. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. 1972); Commonwealth v. Simms,
228 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 324 A.2d 365 (1974) (Spaeth, J., concurring) (Hoffman, J., dissenting),
rev'dper curiam, 462 Pa. 26, 333 A.2d 477 (1975): T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY
(1963) [hereinafter cited as SZASZ]; Allen, The Brawner Rule - New Lyricsfor an Old Tune,
1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 67; Goldstein & KatzAbolish the "Insanity Defense"- Why Not? 72 YALE
L.J. 853 (1963); Note, Modern Insanity Tests - Alternatives, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 88 (1976).
3. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 123-37.
4. E.g., Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 518-19
(1968). The defendant's only burden is to produce evidence of insanity; once that is satisfied,
the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Rose, 457
Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974) (intoxication); Commonwealth v. Demmit, 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d
627 (1974) (insanity); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 8 (1972). See notes 55-75
and accompanying text infra.
5. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
ern rule proposed by the American Law Institute (ALI).6 The disa-
greement that has arisen regarding the insanity defense suggests
serious theoretical and political difficulties for each of the positions
that has been proposed or adopted.
This comment will examine an alternative proposal that has
been adopted in Michigan, the verdict of "guilty but mentally ill,"
and propose its adoption in Pennsylvania.7 This innovative proposal
provides that a defendant who pleads insanity may be found guilty
but mentally ill (GBMI) in the event the fact-finder affirmatively de-
cides that he is guilty of the offense and was mentally ill, but only to
some extent not warranting his legal exculpation, at the time the
crime was committed.'
Although this creative alternative to the traditional verdicts of
"guilty" or "not guilty by reason of insanity"9 retains the basic theo-
retical deficiencies of the insanity defense, it represents a compro-
mise position that substantially accomplishes the purposes of both
those who argue for the abolition of the insanity defense and those
who advocate adopting the ALl test of criminal responsibility. '
0
Moreover, the GBMI verdict provides a workable middle
ground for fact-finders who must face the vagaries of conflicting psy-
chiatric opinion," the restrictions of constitutional due process, 2
and the public concern that justice be done by convicting the guilty
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong.
Id at 722. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960); Hall,
Responsibility and Law. In Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956); Insanity as
a Defense, 37 F.R.D. 365, 369 (1964) (remarks of Chief Justice Weintraub); Livermore &
Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789 (1967).
6. ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(l) (Proposed Official Draft 1962): "A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." See notes 98-116 and
accompanying text infra.
7. MICH. COMp. LAWS § 768.36 (Supp. 1980). See generally Corrigan & Grano, 1976
Annual Survey of Michigan Law. Criminal Law, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 473 (1977); Comment,
Insanity-Guily But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity An Aggregate Approach to Madness,
12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. PROC. 351 (1979); Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: 4n Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URB. LAW 471 (1976); Comment, The Constitutionality of Michi-
gan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J. LAW REF. 188 (1978).
The Pennsylvania House of Representatives has passed a bill that would create a "guilty
but mentally ill" verdict in the Commonwealth, H.B. 1162, Printer's No. 3436 (165th Session
1979). See notes 143-160 and 187-214 and accompanying text infra.
8. MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36(I) (Supp. 1980).
9. The court must also instruct the jury that they may bring in a "not guilty" verdict.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 394 Pa. 335, 147 A.2d 313 (1959).
10. See notes 138-142 and 156-160 and accompanying text infra.
11. E.g., Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Blocker was granted a
new trial when the psychiatrists who testified that his psychopathy was not a mental disease
reversed their opinion less than a month later.
12. The Supreme Courts of Mississippi and Washington have held that the insanity de-
fense is required by the due process clause of their state constitutions. Sinclair v. State, 161
Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910).
and acquitting the innocent.' 3
II. Concepts of Mental Illness
The root of the controversy surrounding the insanity defense is
the lack of a societal consensus on the definition of mental illness
and its relationship to criminal behavior. 4 One psychologist has
criticized the term "mental illness" as "a big umbrella,"' 5 under
which are gathered
people with organic problems and people with non-organic
problems; people with perceptual difficulties and people with be-
havioral difficulties; people whose brains have been damaged and
people who .. .have never learned how to get along in life.
Those who are criminal or guilty or lazy have found escape be-
neath the umbrella together with those who are senile and those
who have glandular problems. This is truly a most motley mob.16
13. See J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 95-108 (1955). Of the circumstances in which the
M'Naghten rule was announced, Judge Biggs wrote,
I think the Queen and the lords put a hot fire to the feet of the judges of England.
They were under pressure from the Crown, the lords, the press and were in a very
difficult situation. The judges were in effect called to account for what seemed to be
miscarriages of justice in which murderers went unpunished.
Id at 107.
14. See generally A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 21-
88 (1974); P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 14-29 (1958); SZASZ, supra note 2, at 11-36; T.
SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
15. J. ADAMS, THE BIG UMBRELLA 3 (1972).
16. Id A psychiatrist has stated the matter as follows:
The concept of illness, whether bodily or mental, implies deviation from a clearly
defined norm. In the case of physical illness, the norm is the structural and func-
tional integrity of the human body. Although the desirability of physical health, as
such, is an ethical value, what health is can be stated in anatomical and psysiological
terms. What is the norm deviation from which is regarded as mental illness? This
question cannot be easily answered. But whatever this norm may be, we can be cer-
tain of only one thing; namely, that it must be stated in terms of psychosocial, ethical,
and legal concepts. For example, notions such as "excessive repression" or "acting
out an unconscious impulse" illustrate the use of psychological concepts for judging
so-called mental health and illness. The idea that chronic hostility, vengefulness, or
divorce are indicative of mental illness is an illustration of the use of ethical norms
(that is, the desirability of love, kindness, and a stable marriage relationship). Fi-
nally, the widespread psychiatric opinion that only a mentally ill person would com-
mit homicide illustrates the use of a legal concept as a norm of mental health. The
norm from which deviation is measured, when one speaks of a mental illness, is a
psychosocial and ethical one. Yet, the remedy is sought in terms of medical measures
which - it is hoped and assumed - are free from wide differences of ethical value.
The definition of the disorder and the terms in which its remedy is sought are there-
fore at odds with one another. The practical significance of this covert conflict be-
tween the alleged nature of the defect and the remedy can hardly be exaggerated.
SZASZ, supra note 2, at 14 (emphasis in original).
Organic diseases or injuries are demonstrably present in some persons who are referred to
as mentally ill. For example, arteriosclerosis of the brain or a crushed skull will cause changes
in the ability of the brain to function, like breathing coal dust causes "black-lung" disease.
These changes may be physiologically documented, and their probable effects on the behavior
of the individual testified to, by ordinary medical doctors, as opposed to psychiatrists. J. AD-
AMS, THE BIG UMBRELLA 5-9 (1972). Organic illnesses, however, are rarely encountered in
criminal cases. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 31 (1967). Moreover, medical testi-
mony in such cases should be sufficient to sustain a total or partial defense based on the invol-
untary nature of the act, or on some mistake of fact, perhaps induced by a hallucination. See
Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to "Abolish" the Insanity Defense in S. I.- Squeezing a
Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1976). For example, an involuntary hallucinator who believes
Further, the failure to distinguish between deviant behavior that
has organic causes, and behavioral difficulties without organic causes
ignores an important distinction between the cause of behavior, and
the motivation for behavior.' 7 In criminal law, if a defendant has
caused the prohibited act while entertaining the appropriate mens
rea (for example, knowing or willing that the act be done), he should
be convicted.' 8 A defendant's motives, with the few exceptions of
justification or excuse which may be objectively demonstrated, are
generally unimportant except as evidence of his intent or to cast
doubt on circumstantial evidence linking him to the crime.' 9
The confusion that has been interjected into the law by this fail-
ure to distinguish motivation from causation, and ethics from
medicine, is evident in the courtroom and in the disposition of those
who are found not guilty by reason of insanity. A constant theme of
judicial opinions in the District of Columbia has been the attempt to
prevent the jury from being confused and overwhelmed by the lan-
guage, concepts, and conclusions presented by psychiatrists.2" The
language is confusing enough: "Words like association, maniac, ad-
justment, . . . incompetent and dozens of others have general Eng-
lish meanings apart from their technical meanings in psychiatry. To
the psychiatrist, the word hysteria suggests blindness or paralysis; to
the jury it suggests a temper tantrum."'"
The concepts of psychiatry are as confusing as the language.
Psychiatric data consists almost entirely of the patient's behavior and
communications (a type of behavior).22 The psychiatrist imports
into his interpretation of this data whatever presuppositions he holds
about the individual involved and about what kind of behavior is
he is squeezing lemons when he is actually strangling his wife could be exculpated on the basis
of a mistake of fact, should the jury believe his story, and would not need the insanity defense.
But see ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
17. Motive must be clearly distinguished from causation or intent. M'Naghten, for ex-
ample, was. said to be suffering from paranoid delusions (false ideas of persecution or gran-
deur) in which Sir Robert Peel, the man he intended to shoot, appeared as one of the
persecutors. Although these false ideas may have motivated M'Naghten to attempt to kill Peel
(Peel's secretary, Drummond, was actually shot), the ideas themselves, apart from
M'Naghten's action upon them, were not the cause of the shooting. See J. BIGGS, THE
GUILTY MIND 97 (1955). Motive explains why the act was done, cause explains how it was
accomplished. Although society recognizes some reasons as excusing actors from criminal lia-
bility, it usually does so on the basis of objectively verifiable facts, for example, self-defense, or
mistake. The insanity defense recognizes an excuse for individualistic motives, not subject to
verification by objective methods nor to legislative approval. See Commonwealth v. Norman,
259 Pa. Super. 301, 306-07, 393 A.2d 837, 840 (1978) (Cercone, J., opinion in support of affirm-
ance).
18. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 2 (1972).
19. Id § 29.
20. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 163-170 (1967): See note 57
infra.
21. Davidson, Psychiatrists in Administration of Criminal Justice, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
12, 15-16 (1954).
22. Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and
Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1965).
"normal." Even behavior that is not otherwise remarkable may be
considered "abnormal" when exhibited by one who is presupposed to
be mentally ill.23 In this manner, the term, "mental illness," is used
to disguise "a covert comparison or matching of the patient's ideas,
concepts, or beliefs with those of the observer and the society in
which they live."24 Thus, the psychiatrist who testifies that a defend-
ant is mentally ill is essentially pronouncing a conclusion that the
defendant's behavior is morally improper, as measured by the psy-
chiatrist's own values or by the values of society.25
The jury is not deceived by this disguise, however. They know
that an acquittal by reason of insanity does not automatically lead to
freedom for the defendant, as is true of anyone else who is acquit-
ted.26 Even if the jury believes the defendant is responsible for his
crime, they often want him to receive mental health treatment he
would not otherwise receive in prison, in the belief that it will help
him refrain from committing crimes in the future.27 If this scenario
is true, the insanity acquittal in reality serves as an insanity convic-
tion.
The resulting legal anomaly is that society treats one who has
been acquitted by reason of insanity as if he were guilty.28 For ex-
ample, a successful insanity defense results in the incarceration of
23. For example, an individual's statement that he is being pursued by Communists may
be a sign of "mental illness," but it is more likely that the speaker is deliberately lying, mis-
informed, or actually being pursued by Communists. Moreover, such a statement is only a
sign of "mental illness" if the listener believes the speaker is not being pursued. See T. SZASZ,
PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE, 164-65 (1965).
24. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 13.
25. Id at 13-16. Ironically, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare recently
reported that two-thirds of the full-time staff psychiatrists at one state mental hospital are
"seriously mentally ill." Memorandum from Dr. Scott H. Nelson, Deputy Secretary for
Mental Health, to Hon. Helen O'Bannon, Secretary of Public Welfare, August 8, 1980.
26. In Pennsylvania, the court is required, upon the defendant's request, to instruct the
jury that the defendant is subject to involuntary commitment to a state mental hospital if he is
acquitted by reason of insanity. Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 271, 380 A.2d 349 (1977).
Accord, Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958);
362 U.S. 943 (1960), 368 U.S. 992 (1962); Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 323
N.E.2d 294 (1975); People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354 (1969); State v. Krol, 68
N.J. 236, 265, 344 A.2d 289, 304-05 (1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 552.030(7), 552.040(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1980): but see State v. Bott, 310 Minn. 331, 246 N.W.2d 48 (1976); State v. Garrett, 391
S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1965). The reason the defense requests such an instruction is that if the jury
mistakenly believes that an acquittal by reason of insanity means freedom for the defendant,
they will be more likely to return a guilty verdict. Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, supra. The
court may, sua sponte or at the prosecutor's request, instruct the jury on the disposition of the
defendant if he is found "guilty but mentally ill." People v. Thomas, 96 Mich. App. 210, 292
N.W.2d 523 (1980); People v. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. 326, 287 N.W.2d 223 (1980).
27. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 170-75 (1967). Ms. Simon
suggests that the jurors believed the "ideal solution ... would [allow] them to find the defend-
ant guilty but in need of medical treatment." Id. at 172.
28. Pugh, The Insanity Defense in Operation: .4 Practicing Psychiatrist Views Durham and
Brawner, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 87, 92. The guilty are also treated as if they are mentally ill. In
Pennsylvania prisons, educational, vocational training, and religious programs are adminis-
tered by a Deputy Superintendent for Treatment.
the acquitted defendant for an indefinite period of time,29 which may
be longer than the sentence that might have been received had he
been convicted.3" Furthermore, the conditions in the hospitals to
which insanity acquittees in Pennsylvania are involuntarily commit-
ted are not substantially different than conditions in the prisons
where convicts are incarcerated. 31 Moreover, the proposed Federal
Criminal Code provides for the conditional release of a defendant
acquitted by reason of insanity, as if he were on parole. 2 Last, the
public stigma associated with an insanity acquittal is little different
from that accompanying a guilty verdict.
33
The continued use of the medical label "mental illness" has also
resulted in the recognition that prisoners have a constitutional right
to psychiatric services as part of adequate medical care,34 and like
other patients, a right to refuse psychiatric treatment in some, though
not all, circumstances.35 This recognition of the right to refuse cer-
tain kinds of psychiatric treatment defeats the true purpose of insti-
tutional psychiatry, which is to induce or compel behavioral changes
in those who have been sent to mental hospitals.36
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(g)(2), (4) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
30. In August, 1979, there were about twelve residents of Farview State Hospital for the
Criminally Insane who had been there for a minimum of thirty years. Though now eligible for
release, most need true medical care and have no families or friends to provide for-them.
Conversation with Superintendent Robert Hamill, August 1979. Prior to the enactment of the
Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976, there was no automatic review proceeding to deter-
mine the continuing necessity for treatment. Compare the Mental Health Procedures Act of
1976, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7 304(g) (Purdon Supp. 1980) with the Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4418 (Purdon 1969) (repealed) and
the Mental Health Act of 1951, §§ 341, 351, 601, 603, 1951 Pa. Laws 533, 554, 557, 561-62
(repealed).
Although current statutes tend to ensure that a defendant will not spend a lifetime behind
the bars of a mental hospital, this is a recent development in the law, which has addressed the
constitutional issues raised by the incarceration of an acquitted defendant. The statutes appear
to have been passed in response to court decisions that treated the verdict of acquittal seri-
ously, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
31. Farview State Hospital for the Criminally Insane is a maximum-security institution
with bars on the windows, solitary cells for extremely disruptive inmates, and a controlled
regimen for all its residents. See GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON MAXIMUM SECURITY PSYCHI-
ATRIC CARE, A PLAN FOR FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN PENNSYLVANIA 6-10
(1977).
32. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3613(e), 3616(e) (1979) (as reported). See S. REP.
No. 553, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1112-25.
33. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 18-23; Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S.
CAL. L. REV. 514, 524-25 ((1968). Cf Vitek v. Jones, 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980) (prisoners may
not be transferred to mental health facility without prior hearing because of increased loss of
liberty and stigmatization); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (State required to present
"clear and convincing" evidence to sustain petition for civil commitment to mental hospital
because of deprivation of liberty and stigma on individual).
34. Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1979) (county jail
must provide adequate psychiatric care to inmltes). See People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632,
288 N.w.2d 909 (1980), see notes 172-82 and accompanying text infra.
35. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), enforced, 476 F. Supp. 1294
(D.N.J. 1979).
36. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 39-56.
III. Criminal Insanity in Pennsylvania
The law of insanity in Pennsylvania has not escaped the confu-
sion bred by the failure to adequately define "mental illness." Al-
though the M'Naghten test of insanity remains solidly entrenched,37
there have been recent shifts in the law pertaining to the burden of
proof 38 and the disposition of insanity acquittees. 39 Moreover, the
M'Naghten rule remains under attack from those who would abolish
the insanity defense altogether and those who advocate adopting the
ALl test of insanity, a more liberal rule than M'Naghten. 4
A. Current Law
1. The M'Naghten Rule. -This classic test of insanity was ini-
tially enunciated by Lord Chief Justice Tindal in the House of Lords
in 1843. In its original formulation, the question to be asked the jury
was whether
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or,
if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.4
The M'Naghten rule was adopted in Pennsylvania in Common-
wealth v. Mosler,42 only three years after M'Naghten was decided.
In Mosler, a murder trial presided over by three justices of the
Supreme Court, the jury was instructed that
[the] man may be mad on all subjects; and then, though he may
have glimmerings of reason, he is not a responsible agent. This is
general insanity; but if it be not so great in its extent or degree as
to blind him to the nature or consequences of his moral duty, it is
no defence. . . . It must be so great as, entirely to destroy his per-
ception of right and wrong; . . . It must amount to delusion or
hallucination, controlling his will and making the commission of
the act, in his apprehension, a duty of overruling necessity.43
Although the original formulation of the M'Naghten rule fo-
cuses on the defendant's knowledge, the court in Mosler adopted an
additional test of insanity, focusing on the ability of the accused to
control his actions:
But there is a moral or homicidal insanity, consisting of an
irresistible inclination to kill, or to commit some other particular
offence. There may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind,
37. Commonwealth v. Reason, 485 Pa. 450, 453 n.3, 402 A.2d 1358, 1359 n.3 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Harper, 479 Pa. 42, 387 A.2d 824 (1978).
38. See notes 55-75 and accompanying text infra.
39. See notes 76-82 and accompanying text infra.
40. See notes 83-118 and accompanying text infra.
41. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
42. 4 Pa. 264 (1846).
43. Id at 266.
drawing it to consequences it sees, but cannot avoid, and placing it
under a coercion, which, while its results are clearly perceived, is
incapable of resistance."
This "irresistible impulse," or "control," test may be employed to
excuse the defendant from responsibility for his acts if his insanity
[mental illness] prevented him from controlling his will with respect
to those acts.45 Critics of this test have asserted that it is impossible
to devise an objectively verifiable test to determine when the defend-
ant could not control himself and when he merely would not.46 For
this reason, its application in Pennsylvania, where it is known as the
homicidal mania doctrine, is severely restricted. Chief Justice Gib-
son in Mosler clearly sought to limit the doctrine:
The doctrine. . . . can be recognized only in the clearest
cases. . . . If juries were to allow it as a general motive, . . . its
recognition would destroy social order as well as personal safety.
To establish it as a justification . . . it is necessary either to show,
by clear proofs, its contemporaneous existence evinced by present
circumstances, or the existence of an habitual tendency .... be-
coming in itself second nature.4 7
There is now some confusion in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court regarding the status of the homicidal mania doctrine.48 This
confusion developed when the court assumed the existence of the
homicidal mania doctrine in two cases in which it also rejected the
irresistible impulse test, without clearly distinguishing between the
two.4 9 In any event, the court has twice recently assumed that the
homicidal mania defense is recognized in Pennsylvania, but has re-
fused to reverse for failure to instruct the jury about the defense,
holding that the evidence did not meet the threshold burden of clear
proof required by Mosler. 0
44. Id at 267 (emphasis in original).
45. Although some courts have believed that an "impulse" is required, see, e.g., Durham
v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("the 'irresistible impulse' test is . . .
inadequate in that it gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and
reflection .... "), other cases have not so limited the test, e.g., State v. Reidell, 14 Del. (9
Houst.) 470, 14 A. 550, 552 (1888) "[Tihere is a certain disease of the mind called melancholia
which sometimes operates upon the power of the will").
46. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 67-68 (1967). See generally Keedy, Irre-
sistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 956 (1952).
47. 4 Pa. at 267 (emphasis added). See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Pa. 304, 310,
329 A.2d 212, 214-15 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 981 (1975); Commonwealth v. Woodhouse,
401 Pa. 242, 256-59, 164 A.2d 98, 106-07 (1960).
48. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Pa. 304, 310, 329 A.2d 212, 214-15 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 981 (1975).
49. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 256-59, 164 A.2d 98, 106-07; Common-
wealth v. Daverse, 364 Pa. 623, 625, 73 A.2d 405, 406 (1950). In fact, there is no substantial
difference between the two. The source of the confusion is probably in Commonwealth v. Cava-
lier, in which the court cited Mosler and stated that the irresistible impulse theory cannot be
recognized "without limitations or conditions of any sort. If there has been any departure
from the wise rule which makes the test of the accused's responsibility, his ability to distinguish
between right and wrong, it has been surrounded at all times with the restrictions imposed by
Chief Justice Gibson ..... " 284 Pa. 311, 320-21, 131 A. 229, 233 (1925).
50. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 459 Pa. 304, 310, 329 A.2d 212, 214-15 (1974), cert.
There is no confusion, however, about the status of the
M'Naghten rule. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently
reaffirmed its adherence to the rule, and has refused to adopt any
other. In Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 5 the court rejected both the
Durham "product" rule52 and the irresistible impulse test, conclud-
ing that these tests were not sufficiently free of criticism for the court
to overrule M'Naghten in favor of either of them.53 More recently,
the court has summarily dismissed arguments that the ALl test of
insanity should replace the M'Naghten rule, clearly indicating that
the latter remains well-established in Pennsylvania.54
2. The Burden of Proof. -Although the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court continues to adhere to the M'Naghten rule, the law of insanity
in the Commonwealth has not been static. At least since the time of
M'Naghten every man has been presumed "to possess a sufficient
degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes."55 Accordingly,
both the burdens of production and of persuasion, usually by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, have been placed on the defendant.
56
Under this traditional view, the defendant's sanity is not an element
of the crime. Instead, the insanity plea operates as a plea of confes-
sion and avoidance.57 By raising the insanity defense, the defendant
denied, 420 U.S. 981 (1975); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 443-44, 282 A.2d 693,
698 (1971).
51. 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960).
52. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). "[An accused is not crimi-
nally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or dental defect." Id at
874-75. Hailed by commentators as a great opportunity for psychiatrists to testify in psychiat-
ic terms, unrestricted by the narrow confines of M'Naghten, the Durham decision itself was
eventually narrowed by the efforts of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to reduce the
experts' dominance over the jury that characterized trials under the Durham rule. Washington
v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 454-56 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (prohibiting psychiatric experts from
testifying to "product" relationship, limiting use of medical labels); McDonald v. United
States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (defining mental illness as "any abnormal
condition of the mind which substantially impairs behavior controls"). Durham was overruled
by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (1972) (adopting the ALl Model Penal Code defini-
tion of sanity). The tortured history of Durham is documented in Introduction: The Insanity
Defense in the District of Columbia, United States v. Brawner, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 19. See
generally Kalven, Insanity and the Criminal Law - A Critique of Durham v. United States, 22
U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (1955).
53. "[Tihe other suggested tests are not free from strong-pointed persistent attack and
have engendered apparently, even among the psychiatric critics of the [M'Naghten] rule, justi-
fiable doubts and widespread differences of opinion. Many psychiatrists who are very harsh
critics of "M'Naghten," attack each other's theories even more vehemently." Commonwealth
v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 253-54, 164 A.2d 98, 104-05 (1960) (citations omitted). Accord,
Hall, Responsibility and Law In Defense of the M'Naghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917 (1956);
Livermore & Meehl, The Virtues of M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REv. 789 (1967).
54. Commonwealth v. Reason, 485 Pa. 450, 402 A.2d 1358 (1979); Commonwealth v.
Harper, 479 Pa. 42, 387 A.2d 824 (1978).
55. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). But see Eule, The Presumpti-
on of Sanity: Bursting the Bubble, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637 (1978).
56. E.g., Coyle v. Commonwealth, 100 Pa. 573 (1880) ("fairly preponderating evi-
dence").
57. Goldstein, The Brawner Rule - Why? or No More Nonsense on Nonsense in the Crim-
admits the crime, but seeks to be exculpated and avoid punish-
ment.5" The insanity defense has thus functioned similar to other
defenses that are based on the actor's motivation, such as self-de-
fense or duress.
Recently, however, there has been a trend to shift the burden of
persuasion regarding affirmative defenses to the prosecution. 9
Thus, once the defendant has raised sufficient evidence to put the
matter in issue, the prosecution is required to prove the absence of
the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The rationale for this shift
in the burden of persuasion is that the truth of affirmative defenses
ultimately bears on the issue of guilt, and to permit the jury to con-
vict in spite of their reasonable doubt about the defendant's excuse
would be inconsistent with prohibiting his conviction when they rea-
sonably doubt that the defendant did the act or that he had the re-
quired mens rea.6°
The burden of persuasion on the issue of insanity shifted to the
prosecution in Pennsylvania in 1974, though not without some con-
troversy. In Commonwealth v. Vogel (Vogel I),61 a fragmented court
produced four opinions in reversing the murder conviction of a de-
fendant who had raised the insanity defense. Justices Roberts and
Pomeroy argued that the proper standard required the Common-
wealth to prove Vogel's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
it had failed to do so.6 2 Opposing them, Justices Bell and Eagen
voted to affirm the conviction because Vogel had failed to prove his
inal Law, Please!, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 126, 134-38. Contra, Davis v. United States, 165 U.S.
468 (1895).
58. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 10, 268 A.2d 89, 94 (Jones, J., Supporting the
Order Per Curiam). See note 64 infra.
59. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 8 (1972). Some states adopted this view
at a very early date, e.g., Hopps v. People, 31 111. 385 (1863). See Annot., 17 A.L.R. 3d 146
(1968). The United States Supreme Court adopted this position as a supervisory rule for fed-
eral prosecutions in Davis v. Unitcd States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), explained in Leland v. Ore-
gon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (states may constitutionally require defendants to prove insanity
beyond a reasonable doubt). The vitality of Leland, in doubt after In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (state must prove every fact necessary to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt) and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (requirement that defendant prove that he
acted in heat of passion by a preponderance of the evidence denies due process), was revived
by the Court's summary affirmance in Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S.' 877, affg, 351 A.2d 561
(1976). In Rivera, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld that state's requirement that the de-
fendant prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, and decided that Mullaney and
Winship had not overruled Leland In doing so, the Delaware court relied on the concurring
opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Mullaney, in which he attempted to distinguish the insanity
defense from the "heat of passion" doctrine at issue in that case. See generally Note, Constitu-
tional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendent in Murder
Cases, 56 B.U. L. REv. 499 (1976); Comment, The Burden of Prooffor Extreme Emotional
Disturbance and Insanity: The Determination of Due Process, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 79 (1979). See
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West Supp. 1980).
60. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 59, at § 8. Accord, C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 341 (2d ed., 1972).
61. 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
62. Id at 14, 268 A.2d at 90 (Roberts, J., Supporting the Order Per Curiam); id at 17,
268 A.2d at 102 (Pomeroy, J., Supporting the Order Per Curiam).
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.63 Justices Jones and
O'Brien, however, carried the majority position on both issues, hold-
ing that although the defendant was properly required to persuade
the jury of his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, he had
done so because the prosecution had introduced no direct evidence
to rebut the defendant's evidence of his insanity.64
The "holding" in Vogel I, that the defendant was still required
to prove his insanity, was overruled sub silentio only four years later,
in Commonwealth v. Demmit,65 announced the same day as Com-
monwealth v. Rose. 66 The holdings in both cases required the prose-
cution to shoulder the burden of persuasion on issues relating to the
mental state of the defendant.
In Rose, the accused attempted to defend against a first-degree
murder charge by introducing evidence that he was too intoxicated
to have formed the necessary specific intent to kill, and thus could
only be guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court charged the
jury that Rose was required to prove his intoxication by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
Rose's conviction, ruling that the prosecution must bear the risk of
non-persuasion on every element of the crime, including the specific
intent to kill.6" Thc court indicated, however, that the prosecution
need not directly refute the evidence of intoxication, but could rely
on other evidence to demonstrate the required specific intent .6
In applying the principles of Rose to the insanity defense, how-
ever, the court failed to analyze the differences between the partial
defense of intoxication and the complete defense of insanity. The
Demmitt opinion merely announced, without discussion or even ci-
tation, that "[w]hen the question of sanity is at issue and the pre-
sumption of sanity has disappeared the evidence must be sufficient to
support a finding of sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 69 The result
63. Id at 21, 268 A.2d at 96 (Bell, C.J., Opposing the Order Per Curiam).
64. ld at 12-13, 268 A.2d at 95 (Jones, J., Supporting the Order Per Curiam) (emphasis
in the original):
In the case at bar, the Commonwealth offered no affirmative direct evidence bearing
on the question of the defendant's sanity, i.e., the ability to distinguish between right
* and wrong at the time of the killings. The maximum that might be established by the
testimony of the Commonwealth's lay witnesses is that the actions of the defendant
were apparently intentional. Such testimony did not serve to rebut the defendant's
proof of legal insanity, but merely established the circumstances of the crime and the
events leading to the apprehension of the defendant. . . .However, thefact that an
individual intends to commit an act does not necessarily indicate that he had the ability
to determine whether it was right or wrong to do that act.
Justice Cohen did not express any opinion in the case.
65. 456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974).
66. 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974).
67. Id at 389, 321 A.2d at 884. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
68. 457 Pa. at 389, 321 A.2d at 884.
69. 456 Pa. at 482, 321 A.2d at 631. Accord, Commonwealth v. Tyson, 485 Pa. 344, 402
A.2d 995 (1979); Commonwealth v. Delker, 467 Pa. 305, 356 A.2d 762 (1976); Commonwealth
v. Moyer, 466 Pa. 464, 353 A.2d 447 (1976). Cf. Commonwealth v. Vogel, 458 Pa. 200, 321
of this holding is that the defendant's sanity has become an element
of the crime in Pennsylvania.7 °
If a defendant's sanity is an element of the prosecution's burden
of proof, however, the failure to prove sanity should result in a true
acquittal of the defendant, not an "incarceration-acquittal.' Un-
der Vogel I, in which the defendant had to prove his insanity, the
defendant who met this burden was theoretically excused from crim-
inal liability: all the elements of the crime had, however, been estab-
lished, and this could provide some justification for incarceration for
psychiatric treatment.72 Under Demmitt, the defendant's sanity is
viewed as a necessary element of the crime, and if he is not thought
to be at fault for his insanity, then a new justification for incarcerat-
ing him must be constructed. Perhaps this can be done on the basis
of future dangerousness 73 but such predictions are demonstrably un-
reliable. 74 In any event, the Demmitt court does not discuss the is-
sue. 7
5
A.2d 633 (1974) (Vogel 1I) (affirming grant of third trial because verdict of "guilty" was
against the weight of the evidence). The partial defense of intoxication only reduces the degree
of the crime of which the defendant can be convicted. It applies only to specific intent crimes,
and cannot completely exculpate its owner. Insanity, on the other hand, is a complete defense
which exculpates the defendant, and could conceivably be pleaded as a defense to any crime.
70. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803-04 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
71. Goldstein, The Bra wner Rule - Why? or No More Nonsense on Nonsense in the Crim-
inal Law, Please!, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 126, 134-38. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text
supra.
72. Goldstein & Katz, 4bolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not, 72 YALE L.J. 853,
865-70 (1963).
73. But see Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitu-
tional Analysis, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1277 (1973).
74. Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure fPsychiatric Predictions ofDangerousness: Clear
and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric Predic-
tion of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974). Cocozza and Steadman, researching
involuntary commitments of those deemed incompetent to stand trial under New York's Crim-
inal Procedure Law, found that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness were based on alleged
past behavior, that psychiatrists were no more accurate than laymen at predicting dangerous-
ness, and that of a group of 96 patients hospitalized as "dangerous," only thirteen of them
(14%) were later arrested for a violent offense. Cocozza & Steadman, supra, at 1096, 1098-99.
This evidence demonstrates a substantial overprediction of dangerousness, leading to a depri-
vation of liberty for many who do not actually present a threat to the community. Diamond,
supra at 444, states that there are no known "psychological or physical signs or symptoms
which can be reliably used to discriminate between the potentially dangerous and the harmless
individual." He concludes that psychiatrists routinely overpredict dangerousness because the
"feedback" from a false positive (diagnosed as dangerous, but not actually so) is negligible,
whereas the feedback from a false negative (diagnosed not dangerous and released, but com-
mits violent offense) is immediate and severe. It is thus institutionally and vocationally safe to
overpredict dangerousness. Id at 447.
75. The shift in the burden of persuasion, from defense to prosecution, appears to have
had little or no effect on appellate decisions. With the exceptions of Vogel I and Vogel 14, see
notes 61-64 and 69 and accompanying text supra, this writer has been unable to find a single
case in the Commonwealth in which an appellate court has reversed the conviction of a de-
fendant who raised the insanity defense because the prosecution's evidence was insufficient.
Even Vogel's conviction at his third trial was sustained, Commonwealth v. Vogel Vogel III,
468 Pa. 438, 364 A.2d 274 (1976), as was Rose's conviction upon retrial. Commonwealth v.
Rose,. 463 Pa. 264, 344 A.2d 824 (1975).
3. Disposition. -The underlying differences between the ver-
dict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGRI) and a true acquit-
tal are most clearly demonstrated in what happens to the defendant
who has been acquitted. In Pennsylvania, a defendant may be invol-
untarily committed to a state mental hospital if he is shown to pres-
ent "a clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself."76
Although this same standard also applies to other persons who are
civilly committed, the Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 contin-
ues to distinguish insanity acquittees from others who may be com-
mitted in three respects. First, the only facts necessary to support a
"criminal" commitment are that the acts the defendant was charged
with occurred and that those acts are reasonably likely to be re-
peated.77 A "civil" commitment cannot be sustained absent proof
that the subject injured or attempted to injure himself or others
within the past thirty days. 78 Second, treatment for those acquitted of
specified serious crimes may be continued for up to one year,79 as
opposed to ninety days for all others."0 Last, the discharge of in-
sanity acquittees must be concurred in by the court, after a hearing
in which the district attorney and the county mental health adminis-
trator may participate."' Ordinary patients may be discharged by
the hospital superintendent without such a hearing.82
The Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 attempts to provide
for treatment of insanity acquittees under the same provisions appli-
cable to other persons civilly committed to mental hospitals. The
irony of incarcerating people who have theoretically been acquitted
of crimes, however, remains evident. There is little likelihood that
this situation can be corrected without abolishing the law of insanity,
for the legislative provisions only reflect the popular attitude that
those who have been acquitted of serious crimes by reason of in-
sanity should be incarcerated.
B. Proposals to Replace M'Naghten
With alleged advances83 in the inexact science of psychiatry,84
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
77. Id § 7301(b).
78. Id (emphasis added).
79. Id § 7304(g)(2) (murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping,
rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and arson).
80. Id § 7304(g)(1).
81. Id § 7304(g)(4).
82. Id § 7304(g)(3).
83. Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 219, 360 A.2d 914, 918 (1976); Common-
wealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 385, 292 A.2d 286, 287 (1972).
84. Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and
Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1965).
numerous psychiatrists, defense attorneys, 85 judges, 86 and prosecu-
tors are urging that the M'Naghten rule be abandoned in Penn-
sylvania in favor of some other approach to the problem of insanity.
The most important proposals advanced by opponents of M'Naghten
are to abolish the insanity defense altogether or to adopt the Ameri-
can Law Institute's (ALI) test of insanity. Although these sugges-
tions have been notably unsuccessful, 87 they merit examination in
order to understand why the guilty but mentally ill verdict is a rea-
sonable compromise to these alternatives.
1. Abolition. -Among many psychiatrists and legal scholars,
there is considerable interest in abolishing the insanity defense alto-
gether, and replacing it with a post-conviction proceeding to deter-
mine whether the defendant should be in a prison or a mental
hospital.88 One commentator, Dr. Thomas Szasz, would even elimi-
nate the post-conviction proceeding, on the basis that commitment to
a mental hospital is the equivalent of imprisonment as far as the
offender is concerned.89 Indeed, it may even be worse than impris-
onment, because a convicted prisoner knows the date on which he
must be released; the mental patient knows only that he will get a
hearing every year, at which time he may be released if the psychia-
trists and judge agree that he is no longer dangerous. 90
Abolition of the insanity defense would at once eliminate the
confusion, tension, and illogical distinctions inherent in the law of
insanity as it now exists. Psychiatric testimony, at least on the issue
of insanity, would be eliminated from the courtroom. 9' Understand-
85. Eg., Bailey Attacks Sanity Rule in Appeal to State's High Court, Pittsburgh Post-Ga-
zette, March 5, 1980, at 12, col. 3.
86. Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960) (Bok, J., dissenting);
Commonwealth v. Simms, 228 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 324 A.2d 365 (1974) (Spaeth, J., concurring).
87. Eg., Commonwealth v. Reason, 485 Pa. 450, 402 A.2d 1358 (1979); Commonwealth
v. Harper, 479 Pa. 42, 47, 387 A.2d 824, 827 (1978); Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa.
242, 168 A.2d 98 (1960).
88. See e.g., State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 82, 152 A.2d 50, 74 (1954) (Weintraub, C.J.,
concurring); Goldstein & Katz,,Abolish the "Insanity Defense" - Why Not, 72 YALE L.J. 853
(1963); Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514 (1968) (with
appendix summarizing arguments of leading scholars who favor abolition). House Bill 1162
(Printer's No. 1306), 164th Pa. Gen. Assembly, §§ I & 2 (1979), provided:
The fact that the defendant [was insane under the M'Naghten test] shall not be a
defense to a criminal charge, nor may evidence of such mental state be introduced to
negative the element of intent of the offense, except that evidence of such mental state
of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to reduce
murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of murder.
N .. otwithstanding the provisions of section [one] evidence of the mental state of
the defendant at the time the crime was committed and at the time of the sentencing
proceeding may be offered at such sentencing proceeding in mitigation of sentence.
Any defendant determined by the court to be severely mentally disabled shall be
referred for examination and treatment ....
89. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 228-30. See notes 28 & 31 supra.
90. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(g)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1980).
91. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently been increasing the number of issues
ing that a defendant who is acquitted would go free, jurors and
judges could openly acknowledge their belief that the defendant
should be held responsible for his conduct. In addition, those who
have been adjudicated innocent would no longer be confined in
"hospitals" which have more in common with prisons than with or-
dinary hospitals.
Abolition of the insanity defense would also signal society's rec-
ognition that non-organic "mental illness" is not a medical problem.
Once these "mental illnesses" are recognized as deviations from soci-
ety's social or ethical norms, rather than deviations from medical
norms, "mental health treatment" can be realistically viewed as a
course of action designed to change the "patient's" behavior.92 This
kind of "treatment" is already being provided in prisons today.93
The major impediment to elimination of the insanity defense is
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of
Mississippi and Washington, implicitly accepting the medical model
of mental illness, have decided that the due process clauses of their
respective state constitutions require that a defendant be permitted
to plead insanity as a defense to criminal charges.94 Although the
United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, the
same rationale would arguably apply to the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution. 95
to which psychiatrists may testify as expert witnesses. Traditionally, psychiatrists have been
able to testify about the defendant's competency to stand trial, Commonwealth v. Novak, 395
Pa. 199, 150 A.2d 102, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 882 (1959); his sanity, Commonwealth v. Melton,
406 Pa. 343, 178 A.2d 728, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 851 (1962); and the proper sentence for him,
Commonwealth v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 328 (1947). In recent cases, the court has
expanded the permissible scope of psychiatric testimony to include proof that the defendant
acted in the heat of passion, Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972);
that the defendant subjectively thought he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury when a claim of self-defense is raised, Commonwealth v. Light, 458 Pa. 328, 326 A.2d
288 (1974); that the defendant could not have voluntarily given a confession, even though the
psychiatrist was not present when the confession was made, Commonwealth v. Jones, 459 Pa.
62, 327 A.2d 10 (1974); and that the defendant could not form the specific intent required to
sustain a conviction of first-degree murder, Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d
914 (1976). See Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes Other Than the
Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051 (1975).
92. See SZASZ, supra note 2, at 39-56.
93. One of the stated goals of the prison system is the rehabilitation of the offender. W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTrr, CRIMINAL LAW § 5 (1972). See note 28 supra.
94. Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106,
110 P. 1020 (1910). See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
95. If the Due Process Clause does prohibit the elimination of the insanity defense, the
rationale for such a prohibition is unclear. If the defense is viewed as a true defense, unrelated
to mens rea, then its purpose could be carried out by permitting the jury to apply the test of
whether they believe the defendant can justly be held responsible for his acts. Moreover, this
test is consistent with the "affirmative defense" view of the insanity defense expressed by the
Court in Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, aftg, 351 A.2d 561 (1976) (permitting the states to
impose the burden of proving insanity on the defendant).
The perspective that the insanity defense is not constitutionally required is shared by most
advocates of abolition; only a few commentators, however, are willing to eliminate the concept
of mens rea altogether, and these would permit the court to adjudicate guilt solely on the basis
Because of these state supreme court decisions holding that due
process requires the availability of the insanity defense, legislative
proposals to abolish it have been unsuccessful. An early version of
the proposed Federal Criminal Code would have eliminated mental
disease or defect as a defense to criminal charges, except to the ex-
tent the defendant lacked the state of mind required as an element of
the crime.9 6 The bill was subsequently amended, however, and the
current version retains the insanity defense, although it leaves the
specific test to the courts.
9 7
2. The 4L Test. -The newest test of insanity, the test adopted
by all the federal circuits,98 is that proposed by the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute. This test states that "[a] person
is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."9 9 Despite
the use of this test in every federal circuit, the response among the
states has been less than enthusiastic.I °"
The ALT rule has been described by then-Judge Burger as "es-
sentially M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse recast in modem termi-
of the commission of a prohibited act, even if it is mala in se. P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND
(1958); Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 189 (1962).
96. S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 522 (1975), provided that it was a defense if "the defend-
ant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state of mind required as an element of
the offense charged. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense." Ac-
cord, H.B. 1162 (Printer's No. 1306), 164th Pa. Gen. Assembly (1979). See note 88 supra and
note 120 infra.
97. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 361 2(b) (1979). See S. REP. No. 553, 96 H. Cong., 2d
Sess. 1110-12. One commentator suggested that the courts would respond to the abolition of
the insanity defense by expanding the concept of mens rea. Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal
to "Abolish" the Insanity Defense in S. Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1976).
98. United States v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250, 252 (Ist Cir. 1975) (by implication); United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911 (8th
Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d
908 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420
(10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
99. ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The second para-
graph, intended to eliminate psychopathy as a mental disease or defect, reads as follows: "As
used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct." Id § 4.01(2).
100. Nineteen states have adopted the ALI test. They include Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, Ohio, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Note,
Modern Insanity Tests -Alternatives, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 88, 108 & n.231 (1976) (citing cases
and statutes); see also People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978);
State v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966) (only if defendant accepts burden of
proof); MIcI. COMP. LAWS § 768.2la(l) (Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (1974).
There is no trend toward universal adoption of the ALl rule. Although New Jersey adopted
substantial parts of the Model Penal Code in 1978, it expressly substituted the M'Naghten rule
for the ALl test. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West Supp. 1980).
nology, changing the archaic terms."'' The newer rule uses the
same referents, knowledge and control, that are characteristic of
M'Naghten and the homicidal mania doctrine, the tests used in
Pennsylvania. 0 2 The Third Circuit, however, has refused to adopt
the clause in the ALI rule relating to appreciation of criminality or
wrongfulness, believing that the chief evil of M'Naghten is its out-
dated emphasis on the defendant's knowledge of right and wrong.
0 3
Judge Burger's comments notwithstanding, one significant dis-
tinction exists bctween the ALI rule and the M'Naghten -homicidal
mania doctrine. The ALI rule eliminates the requirement that the
defendant absolutely lack the capacity to know right from wrong or
to control his actions. Under the ALI rule, the defendant who would
successfully invoke the insanity defense need only introduce evi-
dence that he lacked "substantial" capacity to appreciate the wrong-
fulness"° of his conduct or to conform that conduct to the
requirements of the law. This modification was adopted to render
the insanity rule consistent with modem psychiatric theories, which
are reluctant to assert that anyone absolutely lacks capacity for
knowledge or self-control.'0 5 Instead, all that may be said, particu-
larly about an act that occurred at some time in the past, is that there
was some substantial lack of capacity. 1
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Because of its "modem terminology"'0 7 and its conformity to
modem theories of psychiatry that are supposedly more easily un-
derstood by the jurors,0 8 the ALI rule has been hailed as an oppor-
tunity to reduce the dominant role of experts in the insanity trial,
and enable the jury to reclaim its role as the true decision-maker on
the issue of insanity."°9 In this respect, however, the ALI rule has
failed. At best, it only changes the terminology of psychiatric testi-
mony. But the rule also fails to recognize the ethical nature of the
insanity defense, and perpetuates the confusion caused by the term
"mental illness." "0 As long as the legal test of insanity continues to
be based on psychiatric speculation"'I about medical illnesses whose
101. Tenth Circuit Judicial Conference, Panel Discussion, Psychiatry and the Law, 32
F.R.D.. 547, 560 (1962) (remarks of Judge Burger).
102. See notes 42-54 and accompanying text supra.
103. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 & n.32 (3d Cir. 1961).
104. On the distinction between "wrongfulness" and "criminality," see Weihofen, Capac-
ity to Appreciate "Wrongfulness" or "Criminality" Under the ALI Model Penal Code Test of
Mental Responsibility, 58 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 27 (1967).
105. ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Diamond,
From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 191 (1962).
106. Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REv. 59, 73 (1961).
107. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
108. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
109. Id at 981-83.
110. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
111. See Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness: Some Ruminations
and Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1335, 1341-42 (1965).
only objective sign is the patient's own behavior, 112 there can be little
improvement in the prognosis for clarity in the law or in psychiatric
testimony.
Undoubtedly, this modification of the degree of incapacity nec-
essary to exculpate a defendant will enable a larger number of de-
fendants to win acquittals."I3 This increase in insanity verdicts may
in turn lead to a weakening of the deterrent value of the law,'I " at
least to the extent defendants perceive the insanity defense to be an
"easy way out." In addition, the ALI variant of the control test is
subject to the same criticism directed at the irresistible impulse test:
to date, there is no objectively verifiable test that is capable of mea-
suring a defendant's capacity at sometime in the past to control him-
self." '5 Accordingly, any attempt to measure the absolute or
substantial lack of capacity for self-control is meaningless. "
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Because of these shortcomings, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has consistently refused to adopt the ALI rule as the test of
insanity in the Commonwealth.' At the same time, legislative pro-
posals to abolish the insanity defense have been unsuccessful be-
cause of doubt about their constitutionality." 8 The current
dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten test will result in change only if
the opposing advocates recognize the fallacies inherent in the in-
sanity defense and adopt a compromise position. This position must
recognize the constitutional nature of the insanity defense and at the
same time uphold the legitimacy of punishing those who have com-
mitted crimes. The compromise offered by the "guilty but mentally
ill" verdict accomplishes these objectives.
IV. Guilty But Mentally Ill
The innovative concept of the "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI)
verdict was enacted in Michigan in 1975,119 and has recently been
considered in the Pennsylvania General Assembly. 2 ° Although its
112. Id Accord, J. ADAMS, THE BIG UMBRELLA 4-5 (1972); SZAsz, supra note 2, at 14.
113. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 989-90 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
114. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
115. Wootton, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 1019, 1026-27 (1968) (The Insanity Defense, A
Goldstein).
116. The same comment applies to the measurement of a defendant's capacity to know
right from wrong.
117. E.g., Commonwealth v. Harper, 479 Pa. 42, 47, 387 A.2d 824, 827 (1978).
118. See notes 96-97 and accompanying text supra.
119. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36 (Supp. 1980) (effective Aug. 6, 1975).
120. H.B. 1162 (Printer's No. 3436), 164th Pa. Gen. Assembly (1979) [hereinafter cited as
H.B. 1162]. The bill was first introduced as Printer's No. 1306, and proposed the abolition of
the insanity defense. See note 88 supra. In its first amendment (Printer's No. 2410), the bill
was transformed by removing the entire original test of the bill and adding sections nearly
identical to the Michigan statute. The bill was again amended, to its present form, in order to
adapt its provisions to use in Pennsylvania. See notes 143-160 & 187-214 and accompanying
text infra. The New York State Senate has considered and passed a similar bill, S. 4013, 202nd
Leg. Sess. (1979).
definition of "mental illness" relies on the same confused psychiatric
theory which underlies the insanity defense, this alternative promises
to be acceptable to both abolitionists and ALl proponents alike. For
those who advocate abolishing the insanity defense, the statute pro-
vides an alternative verdict which is a step toward abolition without
running afoul of the constitutional probibitions that currently sur-
round that goal. On the other hand, the proposal under considera-
tion in the Pennsylvania General Assembly adopts the ALl rule to
define when a defendant may be found "mentally ill," thus taking
into account the preference of modern psychiatry for the "substantial
capacity" language of that rule.
12 1
A. The Michigan Statute
Michigan's GBMI statute provides the fact-finder with an alter-
native to the traditional verdicts of "guilty" or "not guilty by reason
of insanity"'' 22 when the defendant puts his sanity in issue as a de-
fense to the charges. This new altnerative is not intended to raise the
standard for the insanity defense, nor does it have any effect on the
partial defense of "diminished capacity."'
' 23
The GBMI statute was adopted in response to the Michigan
Supreme Court's decision in People v. McQuillan, 124 which con-
strued that state's automatic commitment law "to require a hearing
to determine whether or not an individual found not guilty by reason
of insanity was presently insane."'' 2' The court found that failure to
provide such a hearing violated the due process and equal protection
requirements of the constitution. 26 Within a short time, two of the
sixty-four inmates who were subsequently released as sane had com-
121. D. MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY (1969), excerpted in A.
BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL MEALTH SYSTEM (1974): "A basic assumption
of the psychodynamic psychiatrist is that disturbed behavior is part of the same continuum as
normal behavior." Id. at 64.
122. The jury may also reach a "not guilty" verdict. Once the insanity defense is used,
however, this verdict is rare, for by its nature, the insanity defense admits the commission of
the act. The jury must be instructed about the "not guilty" verdict. People v. White, 81 Mich.
App. 335, 265 N.W.2d 139 (1978). See note 9 supra.
123. Under this defense, psychiatric evidence is admissible to demonstrate that the de-
fendant was incapable of forming the requisite state of mind, such as premeditation in first
degree murder, which is an element of specific intent crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Brawn-
er, 471 F.2d 969, 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (expert testimony must rest on the premise of a
mental abnormality and be grounded in sufficient scientific support to warrant courtroom use);
People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa.
210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976). See generally Comment, Insanity - Guilty But Mentally Ill - Di-
minished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. PROC. 351 (1979).
The GBMI verdict should also be distinguished from the "guilty but insane" labels often
given to proposals to abolish the insanity defense and replace it with a pre-sentencing proceed-
ing to determine whether the defendant was severely mentally disabled and should be commit-
ted to a mental hospital rather than thrown in jail. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
124. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
125. Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill" An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J.
URB. LAW 471 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment GBMI].
126. 392 Mich. at 530-36, 221 N.W.2.d at 577-80 (1974).
mitted other violent crimes.' 27  In the wake of the public uproar
which followed, the Michigan Legislature passed the GBMI stat-
ute. 128
1. Substantive Provisions. -The law in Michigan provides that
the fact finder may return a GBMI verdict in any case in which the
defendant asserts that he should be acquitted by reason of in-
sanity. 129 Before a GBMI verdict may be returned, the trier of fact
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
an offense, that he was mentally ill when the crime was committed,
and that he was not legally insane when the crime was committed. '30
A defendant may plead GBMI, but the judge is not permitted to
accept the plea until he has held a hearing on the issue of mental
illness and is satisfied that the defendant was actually mentally ill
when the crime was committed.'
3'
A defendant who has been found GBMI may be given the same
sentence as any defendant who is merely found "guilty.' 1 32 Once
incarcerated, however, he must be evaluated and provided whatever
treatment is indicated for his mental illness. Treatment may be pro-
vided by Michigan's Department of Corrections or Department of
Mental Health. 3 3 If the latter is involved, the provisions of Michi-
gan's Mental Health Code govern the offender's transfer between
agencies. 
34
127. Comment, GBMI, supra note 125, at 471-72.
128. Id at 472.
129. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36(1) (Supp. 1980). Further, the jury must be instructed in
the law regarding insanity, mental illness and mental retardation before the court hears any
expert testimony on those issues. People v. Mikulin, 84 Mich. App. 705, 270 N.W.2d 500
(1978). The Mikulin court indicated that it was not deciding "[wihether the court must honor a
defense request that the instruction on guilty but mentally ill not be given, or whether any
error is waived by failing to object to the court's failure to include such an instruction ....
Id at 709, 270 N.w.2d at 502. In People v. Thomas, 96 Mich. App. 210, 292 N.W.2d 523
(1980), the court held that MICH. COMp. LAWS § 768.29a requires the court to instruct the jury
on the GBMI verdict over the defendant's objection when the evidence warrants such an in-
struction. Id at 220-21, 292 N.W.2d at 527. The statutory language requires the judge to
instruct on insanity, mental illness, and mental retardation prior to receiving any expert testi-
mony on the matter of insanity. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 768.29a(l) (Supp. 1980).
130. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36(I) (Supp. 1980). Section 768.36 does not have its own
definition of "mental illness," but adopts the definition used in civil commitment proceedings
under Michigan's Health Code. Id § 330.1400a (1980). See People v. Darwall, 82 Mich. App.
652, 267 N.W.2d 472 (1978).
131. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 768.36(2) (Supp. 1980). For procedural purposes, the GBMI
plea has been likened to a plea of guilty. Thus a preliminary examination transcript may not
be used to establish the factual basis of a GBMI plea in place of the defendant's own testi-
mony. People v. Long, 86 Mich. App. 676, 273 N.W.2d 519 (1978); People v. Booth, 86 Mich.
App. 646, 273 N.W.2d 510 (1979).
132. "If a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill or enters a plea to that effect which is
accepted by the court, the court shall impose any sentence which could be imposed pursuant to
law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense." MICH. COMp. LAWS § 768.36(3)
(Supp. 1980).
133. Id
134. Id §§ 330.2000 et seq. (1980).
An offender who is found GBMI must also serve his sentence
like any other convicted defendant. A mental health facility that dis-
charges an offender from treatment back into the general prison sys-
tem must file a report with the parole board explaining the offender's
condition, course of treatment, potential for remission, recidivism,
and danger to himself or the public.'35 If he is released on parole or
probation, continuation of a course of treatment may be made a con-
dition thereof, and the offender's failure to obey may lead to the rev-
ocation of parole or probation.'36 In addition, an offender who is
placed on probation must be given a minimum term of five years,
which is subject to reduction if the court first considers a forensic
psychiatric report on the offender's condition.
37
2. Purpose. -The GBMI verdict is designed to rationalize the
inconsistencies in the state's treatment of those individuals who
plead insanity as a defense to criminal charges. These inconsisten-
cies stem from the confusion generated when the medical label,
"mental illness," is applied to what is actually a deviation from soci-
ety's norms of behavior.' 3 The GBMI verdict addresses empirical
evidence indicating that acquittal by reason of insanity is often a
compromise verdict. 139 It enables the jury to openly convict the de-
fendant (incarceration results) while ensuring that he receives mental
health treatment. By enabling the jury to hold the defendant respon-
sible for his acts, the GBMI verdict recognizes the underlying ten-
sion between the medical and ethical models of mental illness, and
resolves that tension in favor of the ethical model."4
The GBMI verdict represents a true compromise between those
who advocate liberalizing the insanity defense and those who would
abolish it altogether. The stigma attached to an insanity acquittal
and the incarceration of the supposedly acquitted defendant render
this form of acquittal indistinct from a conviction. 4 ' Thus, the pur-
pose of abolitionists and ALI proponents alike-to provide mental
health treatment to those who have violated ethical or social
norms 4 2-is well-served by adoption of the GBMI verdict.
135. Id § 768.36(3).
136. Id.
137. Id § 768.36(4).
138. See notes 14-36 and accompanying text supra.
139. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 170-75 (1967). See notes 26-
27 and accompanying text supra.
140. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 28-36 and accompanying text supra.
142. See notes 25 & 36 and accompanying text supra.
B. The Pennsylvania Proposal - "Mentally Ill"
House Bill 1 16214' has modified Michigan's statute in several
key areas to strengthen the bill from a policy perspective and to con-
form its provisions to the context of Pennsylvania law and practice.
The most important difference between the two statutes lies in the
definition of "mentally ill."
Most states, including Michigan and Pennsylvania, have a defi-
nition of "mental illness" or its functional equivalent, "severely men-
tally disabled,"'"4 in their statutes governing involuntary civil
commitment to mental hospitals. ' 5 The Michigan GBMI statute de-
fines "mental illness" by reference to the standard necessary to sus-
tain a civil commitment: "a substantial disorder of thought or mood
which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recog-
nize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life."'
' 46
Adoption of the Michigan definition of "mental illness" into a
Pennsylvania GBMI statute would undoubtedly create uncertainties
regarding interpretation of this term. For this reason, if a civil com-
mitment standard is appropriate at all, the definition of "severely
mentally disabled"' 47 already found in the Pennsylvania Mental
Health Procedures Act' 48 is preferable. But this position produces
another, more serious, problem. Because "mental illness" is usually
defined and diagnosed in terms of the behavior of an individual, in
many cases the same actions that serve to justify a civil commitment
could also be the basis for criminal prosecution. 14  Thus, civil com-
mitment is viewed as a "clean" route to avoid prosecution where
some mental illness is alleged. Clearly, importing such a definition
into the criminal law will quickly create a situation in which every
violent criminal could be found GBMI.150
143. H.B. 1162, supra note 120.
144. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980): "A person is severely men-
tally disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment,
and discretion in the conduct of his own affairs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present
danger to others or to himself."
145. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.010(16) (Vernon Supp. 1980) ("... a state of impaired
mental processes, which results in a distortion of a person's capacity to recognize reality due to
hallucinations or delusions or faulty perceptions or alterations of mood, and interferes with an
individual's ability to reason, understand or exercise conscious control over his actions, and
may be manifested by instances of grossly impaired behavior."); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 1.03(20) (McKinney 1978) (". . . an affliction with a mental disease or mental condition
which is manifested by a disorder or disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking, or judgment to
such an extent that the person afflicted requires care, treatment and rehabilitation.").
146. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 330.1400a (1980).
147. See note 144 supra
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1980).
149. Id § 7301(b)(1): "Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by establishing
that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm
on another. ... See Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to '"bolish "the Insanity Defense in
S. I. Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 690 n.16 (1976).
150. E.g., P. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 29 (1958) ("[The] traditional insistence that the
criminal must be basically different from mentally ill persons. . . is a theological concept and
An additional problem raised by involuntary commitment stan-
dards is that they often rely on a prediction of future danger to one's
self or to others.' Recent studies have clearly demonstrated that
psychiatrists cannot reliably predict dangerousness 15 2 and thus,
troubling questions of due process, already present in civil commit-
ment proceedings, would be imported into the criminal law.' 3 Un-
less the true basis of criminal sanction lies in past acts, the
alternative verdict of GBMI and its ensuing differential treatment
for those who are guilty and mentally ill would violate the Due Proc-
ess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. 1 54 Punishment
cannot be based on what we expect people to do in the future, but on
what they have done in the past.' 55
Assuming the modern theory that there is a spectrum along
which may be found degrees of mental health, illness, and in-
sanity, 56 House Bill 1162 adopts, as its definition of mentally ill, the
American Law Institute's definition of legal insanity.'57 This test of
insanity requires only that the defendant lack "substantial" capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his con-
duct to the law in order to be acquitted.'5 8 By transposing this defi-
nition into a definition of "mentally ill," continuity with M'Naghten
is maintained in terms of both knowledge and capacity for self-con-
trol.
Adoption of the ALl test of insanity to define mental illness fur-
thers the common purpose of both the abolitionist and the ALl pro-
ponent. Under the provisions of House Bill 1162, the defendant who
is found GBMI is incarcerated. Similarly, a defendant who is insane
has no basis in fact"); Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, andBeyond, 50 CALIF. L. REV.
189, 205 (1960) (". . . the same humane ... methods that are conducive to the rehabilitation
of the mentally ill and emotionally disordered criminal [may well] be identical with those
required for the supposedly normal and fully responsible offender").
15 1. See, e.g., note 149 supra.
152. Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness. Clear
and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric Predic-
tion of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974) (psychiatrists are no better at predicting
dangerous behavior than laymen).
153. See Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: .4 Suggested Framework For Constitutional
Analysis, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1277 (1973).
154. These violations would occur because the reliability of predictions of dangerousness
is so low as to be irrational; see note 74 supra. Although such imprecision might be tolerable
in civil proceedings, it should not be in criminal actions. See Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095
(1969).
155. To do otherwise would be virtually purposeless. The prevention purpose might be
minimally served with respect to those few truly dangerous people who would be imprisoned.
But many non-dangerous people would also be imprisoned.
156. See note 121 supra.
157. H.B. 1162, § I (proposed 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314(c)): "For the purposes of this
section, a person is "mentally ill" if, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law."
158. ALl MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See notes 98-116
and accompanying text supra.
in a jurisdiction using the ALl rule to define insanity is also incarcer-
ated. Although one bears the stigma of guilt, and the other is called
"insane," the public opinion of the two is not significantly differ-
ent, "'59 and both defendants will be receiving mental health treat-
ment.
Incorporation of the ALI test into House Bill 1162 to define
''mentally ill" also helps to resolve the conflict between the medical
and ethical models of mental illness in favor of the ethical model.
Used in conjunction with M'Naghten, the proposal recognizes the
considerable body of psychiatric opinion that rejects the concepts of
absolute sanity or insanity. 160 Whatever merit this position has from
a medical perspective, deviations from ethical norms are clearly dis-
tributed along a spectrum. Some individuals do not behave as well
as others. All of us misbehave to some extent.
Last, but not least in importance, the adoption of the ALI test to
define "mentally ill" enables House Bill 1162 to avoid one of the
constitutional questions about Michigan's statute now being litigated
in that State's courts.
C Constitutional Objections
Defendants,' 6' commentators, 162 and even one judge' 63 have
mounted three distinct challenges to the constitutionality of the
Michigan GBMI statute. First, critics charge that the definitions of
"mental illness" and "insanity," as they are employed in the statute,
overlap. Consequently, some defendants who should be acquitted
by reason of insanity will be found GBMI. Second, it is alleged that
the Michigan Department of Corrections has violated the eighth
amendment rights of those found GBMI, by failing to provide the
treatment required by statute. Last, the provisions of the statute
fixing a minimum probation term of five years has been alleged to
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
159. SZASZ, supra note 2, at 18-23; Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S.
CAL. L. REV. 514, 524-25 (1968).
160. See note 121 supra.
161. People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980); People v. Ramsey, 89
Mich. App. 468, 280 N.W.2d 565 (1979); People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892
(1979); People v. Darwall, 82 Mich. App. 652, 267 N.W.2d 472 (1978); People v. Jackson, 80
Mich. App. 244, 263 N.W.2d 44 (1978).
162. Comment, Insanity - Guilty But Mentally Ill - Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate
Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. PROC. 351 (1979); Comment, GBMI, supra note
125; Comment, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH.
J. L. REF. 188 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Constitutionality].
163. People v. McLeod, No. 76-01672 (Recorder's Court, Detroit, Mich., Sept. 21, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as McLeodl] (sua sponte raising issues of right to medical care and of equal
protection), rev'd, 77 Mich. App. 327, 258 N.W.2d 214 (1977) [hereinafter cited as McLeod11],
aft'd, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980) [hereinafter cited as McLeod III].
1. Definitions. -A criminal defendant is entitled to a trial in
which his interests are not prejudiced by a misstatement of the
law. 164 A corollary to this canon is that the fact finder must be able
to understand the legal distinctions that may lead to different ver-
dicts. Otherwise, the jury's misunderstanding of the law may lead to
the conviction of defendants who are innocent, or to a defendant's
conviction of greater offenses than he actually committed.' 65  The
Michigan GBMI statute has been challenged on the grounds that the
definitions of "mentally ill" and legal insanity overlap to such an
extent that the trier of fact will be confused by them. 166 Accordingly,
the resulting classification of defendants is irrational, because some
defendants who should be acquitted by reason of insanity will be
found GBMI. 1
67
This possibility for confusion is demonstrated by comparing the
definitions of "mental illness" and "insanity":
To be found GBMI, a defendant must have been mentally ill, but
not legally insane, when he committed the offense. Yet it is hard
to imagine "a substantial disorder of thought or mood which sig-
nificantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize real-
ity, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life" that may
not also be a substantial incapacity "either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of. .. conduct or to conform. . . conduct to the
requirements of law. 168
Unfortunately, this argument has not been adequately consid-
ered by the Michigan Court of Appeals. In a recent decision on the
point, the court simply stated, "A reading of the statutes refutes de-
fendant's argument."169 Obviously, this is not so, and the issue is yet
to be finally decided. 7
This possibility of confusion between the definitions of mental
164. United States v. McGraw, 515 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1975).
165. Of course, the confusion may work to the defendant's advantage, as he may be ac-
quitted of charges he is actually guilty of. This outcome, however undesirable, is less troub-
ling.
166. Comment, Constitutionality, supra note 162, at 195-98 (1978). But see Comment,
GBMI, supra note 125, at 485-89 (suggesting jury instruction sequence to resolve confusion).
167. Comment, Constitutionality, supra note 162, at 195-96.
168. Id at 196 (footnotes omitted).
169. People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich. App. 468, 472, 280 N.W.2d 565, 566-67 (1979). In People
v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979), the Michigan Court of Appeals said,
"Where a state discovers a need to make experimental classifications 'in a practical and troub-
lesome area,' the reviewing court need only 'inquire ... Whether the challenged distinction
rationally furthers some legitimate articulated state purpose.'" Id 88 Mich. App. at 360, 276
N.W.2d at 896 (quoting McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)). The court added,
The fact that these distinctions may not appear clear-cut does not warrant a finding
of no rational basis to make them. As the United States Supreme Court has ob-
served: "The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do
not require, rough accommodations - illogical, it may be, and unscientific.
Id, 88 Mich. App. at 360-61, 276 N.W.2d at 896 (quoting McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. at
270). The court did not, however, attempt to explain what the distinctions were.
170. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in Ramsey and the issue was
not raised in McCleod III supra note 163.
illness and insanity is avoided by the proposal in House Bill 1162.
Pennsylvania, of course, uses the M'Naghten -homicidal mania rule
to define insanity, which requires that the defendant lack all capacity
either to know the wrongfulness of his act, or to control his conduct.
The ALl rule, adopted by the bill to define mental illness, requires
only that the defendant lack substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions or to control his conduct. Although what
constitutes capacity for knowledge or self-control may be open to
question,"'7 the distinction between the meaning of "all" and "sub-
stantial" is easily discerned by any jury.
2. The Right to Treatment. -Several defendants have raised
the objection that the statute's treatment provisions were impossible
for the Michigan Department of Corrections to fulfill.'7 2 The trial
judge in People v. McLeod'73 initially raised the issue sua sponte., 14
In doing so, she took testimony showing that the Department of Cor-
rections employed only one full-time psychiatrist to provide care.for
12,000 inmates at Jackson State Prison, where McLeod was to be
incarcerated. 175 In light of a psychiatric recommendation that Mc-
Leod remain under "close medical observation," 7 and the small
likelihood that he would be transferred to the Department of Mental
Health, 17 7 the court ruled that the purposes of the statute had been
frustrated. 178  Consequently, it was unconstitutional, because the
classification of GBMI offenders resulted in a disposition no differ-
ent from that accorded to a guilty prisoner: No mental health treat-
ment was being provided. 179  As a result, McLeod's GBMI
conviction on arson charges was set aside and a new trial ordered. 1
80
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the issues the
trial judge ruled on had been prematurely raised, because McLeod
had not yet been sentenced. The court found that the trial judge had
engaged in speculation about the conduct of the Departments of
Correction and Mental Health, and reminded her that it must be
presumed that the State would carry out its responsibilities."8 ' Other
171. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
172. McLeod III, supra note 163; People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.w.2d 892
(1979).
173. McLeodl, supra note 163.
174. McLeod II, supra note 163.
175. McLeodl, supra note 163, slip op. at 5.
176. Id at 4 (emphasis in the original).
177. Id at 8. Of 27 people recommended for transfer during the first 13 months the stat-
ute was in force, only 15 had been accepted by the Mental Health Department; II had actually
been transferred. Id at 7.
178. Id at 18.
179. Id at 8.
180. Id at 18.
181. McLeod I, supra note 163. The Supreme Court affirmed this point in its decision,
noting that the failure of the executive branch to carry out its responsibilities "cannot render
opinions of the court of appeals have indicated that the proper rem-
edy for the failure of the executive branch to fulfill its responsibilities
under the statute is a petition in mandamus, not the reversal of the
defendant's conviction.'
8 2
3. Five- Year Minimum Probation Term. -McLeod also raised
the issue of whether the statutory requirement that GBMI offenders
placed on probation be given a five-year minimum term violated the
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause.8 3 The trial court in Mc-
Leod ruled that this "discriminatory legislative policy" could not be
constitutionally justified, since it bore "no relationship to the defend-
ant's mental illness, . . . or the period of time necessary to effectively
treat it. Under no circumstances imaginable could the legislation
[sic] determine that a specified period of five years is necessary to
cure an undefined mental condition."'1
8 4
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the reversal by the court
of appeals of the trial court's ruling on this issue. Finding no suspect
class nor fundamental interest in probation, the court ruled that the
rebuttable8 5 five-year period of probation rationally furthered the
legislature's purpose of providing supervised mental health treat-
ment to those found GBMI.' 6
D. The Pennsylvania Proposal - Other Provisions
In addition to its altered definition of mental illness, House Bill
1162 contains four other modifications of Michigan's GBMI statute.
These provisions would facilitate the application of the GBMI ver-
dict in Pennsylvania by avoiding certain interpretive problems and
streamlining court procedure.
1. Evidence Required At Trial -House Bill 1162 explains that
the insanity defense must be offered at trial in order for its provisions
to be triggered.'87 In Pennsylvania, as in Michigan, the defendant
an otherwise constitutional statute unconstitutional." McLeod 111, 407 Mich. at 655, 288
N.W.2d at 915.
182. People v. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. 326, 287 N.W.2d 223 (1979), People v. Soma, 88
Mich. App. 351, 362, 276 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1979).
183. McLeod , supra note 163, slip op. at 17-18.
184. Id at 18.
185. Although the trial court found that the five-year term was not rationally related to the
statute's purpose, it apparently did so under the mistaken impression that the Legislature had
raised the five-year term as an absolute requirement which could not be abrogated. The lan-
guage of the statute, however, provides that the court may shorten the period of probation
after consideration of a forensic psychiatric report. MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 768.36(4) (Supp.
1980). Thus the legislature has accounted for the variables of treating different mental ill-
nesses.
186. McLeod III, supra note 163, 407 Mich. at 662-64, 288 N.W.2d at 918-19.
187. H.B. 1162, supra note 120, § 1 (proposed 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314(a)): "A person
who offers a defense of insanity at trial..." (emphasis added).
must give notice to the prosecution and the court that he will raise
the insanity defense. '" Failure to give proper and timely notice may
result in a waiver of the defense at trial.8 9 As written, the Michigan
statute could be interpreted as requiring the judge to instruct the jury
about the GBMI verdict even though the defendant has abandoned
his insanity plea or has failed to introduce evidence sufficient to
eliminate the presumption of sanity. 90
2. Right to Refuse Drugs. -A provision has been added to
House Bill 1162 to permit individuals who are receiving mental
health treatment to refuse to take drugs which are prescribed except
in emergency situation when it may be necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily injury to anyone.' 9' This provision recognizes a con-
ditional right, founded in the right of privacy, to refuse medication
in the absence of an emergency. This right was recognized in the
recent case of Rennie v. Klein, in which a federal district court in
New Jersey stated,
The right of privacy is broad enough to protect one's mental
processes from government interference. Additionally, privacy
has been used to establish an individual's autonomy over his own
body. In other contexts, courts have established a constitutional
right of privacy "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances." This
court holds that the right to refuse treatment extends to mental
patients in non-emergent circumstances. This accords with the
usual common law rule against involuntary medical treatment.
Only when the government shows some strong countervailing in-
terest can the right be qualified.'
92
In Rennie, a mental patient sued to enjoin the doctors at a state hos-
pital from forcing him to take drugs, by ingestion or injection, that
had negative side effects on him. Although the court initially denied
the injunction, 9 3 upon the renewal of Rennie's motion, the court
granted a temporary injunction ordering the State of New Jersey to
adopt administrative practices designed to safeguard patients' right
to decline treatment.
194
188. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.20a(l) (Supp. 1980); PA. R. CRIM. P. 305(C)(I)(b).
189. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.21(1) (Supp. 1980); PA. R. CIuM. P. 305(C)(1)(d).
190. E.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 462 Pa. 578, 342 A.2d 84 (1975).
191. H.B. 1162, supra note 120, § I (proposed 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1327(b)(1)):
An offender ... who is committed to the custody of the Bureau of Correction or
county jail shall undergo further evaluation and be provided such treatment as is
psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness, except that he may, by written state-
ment, refuse to take such drugs as may be prescribed. Drugs may be forcibly admin-
istered only in an emergency situation where required to prevent death or serious
bodily harm to any person.
192. 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) (citations omitted).
193. Id at 1154.
194. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979).
3. Transfer Provision. -- One version of House Bill 1162195 per-
mitted the Bureau of Correction to transfer inmates who had been
found GBMI to the Department of Public Welfare without the court
hearing that would otherwise be required by the Mental Health Pro-
cedure Act.196 This provision would have permitted the Bureau to
expedite the transfer of GBMI offenders upon certification by a psy-
chiatrist that adequate mental health treatment for them was not
available within the Bureau. The provision recognized that the Bu-
reau has only minimal psychiatric and clinical psychological person-
nel available, and these individuals are primarily engaged in
diagnostic work with incoming offenders, instead of in treatment
programs. 
197
A similar provision was struck down, however, by the Supreme
Court's decision in Viek v. Jones, 98 in which prisoners who had
been involuntarily transferred from the Nebraska Regional Penal
Complex to the Lincoln Regional Center (LRC) challenged the con-
stitutionality of the statute that authorized their transfer. The state
conceded that the sole reason for plaintiffs' transfer was that they
had been administratively determined to be mentally ill and could
not be adequately treated in the Penal Complex.' 99
The Court initially examined whether any loss of liberty had
occurred. Some changes of status without a hearing do not deprive
one already imprisoned of any liberty.2" An inmate may, however,
have a "right or justifiable expectation rooted in state law that he
will not be transferred except for misbehavior or upon the occur-
rence of other specified events."' The district court in Vitek found
that inmates, by law and practice, were never transferred to the LRC
unless they had been diagnosed as mentally ill and could not be
properly treated at the Penal Complex. This expectation, together
with greater restrictions on freedom of movement at the LRC, the
stigmatizing effect of a transfer, and the use of compulsory behavior
modification programs constituted a "'major change in the condi-
tions of confinement' amounting to a 'grievous loss' of liberty to the
inmate.,, 20 2
Ultimately, the Supreme Court required that all prisoners be
195. H.B. 1162 (Printer's No. 3003), 164th Pa. Gen. Assembly (1979).
196. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7401(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
197. Conversation with Commissioner William Robinson, Bureau of Correction (Febru-
ary 26, 1980).
198. 100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980), aft'g, Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569 (D. Neb. 1977).
199. The Nebraska provision permitted transfer upon a physician's diagnosis of mental
illness and certification that it could not adequately be treated in the prison. 100 S. Ct. at 1262.
200. Id at 1263. Accord, Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215 (1976). In both cases discretionary prison transfers from one state to another
were held not to violate any liberty interest of an inmate.
201. Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976).
202. Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. at 572-73 (footnotes omitted).
given a hearing prior to transfer from the Penal Complex to the
LRC.2 °3 While the hearing must be conducted by a neutral and de-
tached decision-maker, this need not be a judicial officer. Indeed,
members of the hospital or prison administration may serve as hear-
ing officers.2" A written decision is required, stating the evidence
relied on and the reason for the transfer.
20 5
As a result of the Vitek decision, House Bill 1162 was amended
to require the court to hold a new hearing at the time of sentencing
to determine whether the offender continues to be mentally ill.
2°
This provision, parallel to the hearing requirement of the Mental
Health Procedures Act, satisfies the Viek due process requirements
and imposes few additional burdens on the courts and corrections
personnel, because the offender at this time is already entitled to all
of the safeguards required by the Court.2"7 Indeed, he will have an
attorney, not merely an independent advisor, as permitted by Justice
Powell in Vitek. Moreover, psychiatrists and psychologists are often
already involved in sentencing proceedings.20 8
. The purpose of the provision is to expedite the transfer of
GBMI inmates found to require treatment that is not available
within the Bureau of Correction or county jail. Because there are
virtually no psychiatric treatment resources within the Bureau, most,
if not all, GBMI inmates who need treatment, will have to be trans-
ferred to the Department of Public Welfare. 2' This provision aims
to avoid the problem raised by McLeod,21 0 that of inmates who need
treatment, but cannot get it because of the slow pace of transfer hear-
ings." Even if the Bureau were to begin developing a program of
psychiatric care immediately, it would still be several years before the
personnel and facilities could be available to any substantial ex-
tent.21 2
203. 100 S. Ct. at 1265. The district court required seven procedural safeguards: (1) writ-
ten notice that he is being considered for transfer to a mental hospital; (2) a hearing; (3) before
an independent decision-maker; (4) at which he may present testimony and cross-examine
witneses; (5) with the aid of counsel; (6) a written decision; and (7) effective and timely notice
of all these rights. Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. at 575. Only four members of the Supreme
Court agreed that counsel was required, see 100 S. Ct. at 1265-66 (Powell, J., concurring in
part), and only independent assistance is required by Vitek, although counsel is recommended.
204. 100 S. Ct. at 1265.
205. Id See note 203 supra
206. "Before imposing sentence, the court shall hear testimony and make a finding on the
issue of whether the defendant is mentally ill at the time of sentencing." H.B. 1162, supra note
120, § 1 (proposed 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1327(a)).
207. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1405.
208. Id Rule1403(B).
209. Conversation with Commissioner William Robinson, Bureau of Correction (Febru-
ary 26, 1980).
210. People v. McLeod, No. 76-01672 (Recorder's Court, Detroit, Mich., Sept. 21, 1976),
rev'd 77 Mich. App. 327, 258 N.W.2d 214 (1977), afd, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
211. See note 177 supra.
212. Conversation with Commissioner William Robinson, Bureau of Correction (Febru-
ary 26, 1980).
4. Conditions for Parole. -House Bill 1162 protects against
abuse of the GBMI plea by clarifying the conditions under which
parole may be granted. Specifically, the bill states that its provisions
do not require that an offender who is discharged from treatment be
considered for parole prior to the end of his minimum sentence.
21 3
This provision conforms thebill to Pennsylvania practice by respect-
ing the trial judge's decision that the offender receive a particular
mandatory minimum sentance.
214
The variations introduced into House Bill 1162 significantly im-
prove upon the GBMI statute adopted in Michigan. Although this is
most clearly true of the definition of mental illness, the peripheral
variations in the point at which the GBMI verdict is engaged, in the
transfer of inmates from prison to mental hospital, and in the parole
provisions will all work to smoothly adapt the verdict to Penn-
sylvania's criminal law and practice.
V. Conclusion
In the midst of wide dissatisfaction with the insanity defense,
the alternative verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" offers a reasonable
compromise to which all parties in the controversy can assent. Ad-
vocates of the ALI rule and of abolition will find in the GBMI ver-
dict an alternative which, though it does not completely satisfy
anyone, is acceptable to all. Moreover, the verdict offers a solution
to some of the inconsistencies generated by the insanity defense by
permitting the jury to both openly assign guilt and indicate its belief
in the value of mental health treatment for the defendant. The pro-
posal embodied in House Bill 1162 significantly improves the proto-
type GBMI statute enacted in Michigan in 1975 by effectively
adapting it to the use of the M'Naghten rule of insanity and other
practices peculiar to Pennsylvania. For these reasons, the "guilty but
mentally ill" verdict, as established in House Bill 1162, should be
enacted in Pennsylvania.
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